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SOME NOTES ON THE CIVIL JURY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Lawrence M. Friedman*
It is an interesting fact that there is no full scale history of the
American jury. What there is-and the literature is not large-deals
mostly with criminal cases. The criminal jury, after all, is much more
in the public eye than the civil jury. Everybody sees trials on televi-
sion and in the movies. Civil cases are, on the whole, pale and blood-
less in comparison. As a consequence, when ordinary people think
about "the jury," they usually have the criminal jury in mind. This
also seems to be true of some jury scholars. At least one recent, and
rather good book, Jeffrey Abramson's We, the Jury, is subtitled The
Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy.' Although the title does not
say so, the book is entirely about criminal juries.2 The same is true of
the classic study, The American Jury, by Harry Kalven and Hans
Zeisel, published in 1966.3 At the time, Kalven and Zeisel also prom-
ised a volume about the civil jury; but no such book ever appeared. 4
Thus, the criminal jury gets the lion's share of the attention and the
civil jury sits home among the ashes. It is most definitely "unap-
preciated." That word appears in one of the very rare studies of the
history of the civil jury,5 Stephan Landsman's 1993 article, which is
subtitled Scenes from an Unappreciated History.6
* Marion Rice Kirkwood Professor, Stanford University School of Law.
1. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY (1994).
2. Some of the scholarly studies, notably Valerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar's study, JUDGING
THE JURY, contain material on the civil as well as the criminal jury. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL
VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1986).
3. HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
4. For hints about what the study was finding or would have found or did find, see Harry
Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 158
(1958).
5. With regard to English law, there is THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO
CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY, 1200-1800 (1985), on the
history of the English criminal jury. As far as I know, there is no comparable history of the civil
jury.
6. Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 579 (1993) [herinafter Landsman, Unappreciated History]; Stephan Landsman,
The History and Objectives of the Civil Jury System, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY
SYSTEM 22 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
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In a way there is something paradoxical about this general neglect.
It is actually the civil jury, not the criminal jury, that is in the hurri-
cane of controversy. Kalven and Zeisel recognized this in the 1960s:
"most of the unrest over the jury," they remarked, was "limited to its
use in civil trials."' 7 This had, in fact, been true for a long time. I think
it may be a shade less true today, in the light of the fuss over the O.J.
Simpson trial and the Rodney King affair and the like. When the
Simpson trial ended, there was a certain amount of muttering, and
some proposals for reform; but the fuss died down after a while, and
nothing seems to have come of it. The noise over the civil jury, how-
ever, has not subsided-most notably with regard to tort law, products
liability, and medical malpractice-but more generally as well.8 As
Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin put it, juries "lie at the heart of
the ongoing public policy debate over reform in the American civil
justice system." 9 They are accused of all sorts of crimes and dysfunc-
tions, mostly imaginary.' 0
There is in fact an enormous body of mythology about the jury, civil
and criminal. There is a literature-ignored by the public and by poli-
ticians, of course-about what juries really do, how much money they
award, and so on. How they decide is much more elusive. After all,
the jury is a notoriously difficult institution to study in the flesh. The
work of the jury is secret; the jury goes into a locked room, stays in
there, talks and argues, comes out, says a sentence or two, and goes
home. Ordinarily, the jury gives no reasons for what it does. Max
Weber put the jury in the same category as the Delphic oracle and
other forms of irrationality." There is, to be sure, a sizeable and seri-
ous scientific literature about jury decisions, some of it based on simu-
lations and role-playing. Those who want to say something about the
historical jury, alas, have no such data to fall back on.
Alexis De Tocqueville, interestingly, thought the civil jury meant
more for American democracy than the criminal jury.12 Juries, he
thought, "communicate the spirit of the judges to the minds of all the
7. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 9.
8. The attacks are on what juries do, on a legal system allegedly gone amok. They are not
usually explicit attacks on the jury as an institution. But of course when newspapers report "ab-
surd" verdicts of millions of dollars for frivolous cases, they are reporting on the behavior of
juries.
9. STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 1
(1995).
10. Id. This book is an important study debunking the charges against the civil jury.
11. See MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 79 (Max Rheinstein ed., 1954). The
jury resembles the oracle, "inasmuch as it does not indicate rational grounds for its decision."
Id.
12. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 284-85 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1946).
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citizens; and this spirit ... is the soundest preparation for free institu-
tions."'1 3 The jury, in his view, was a kind of "gratuitous public school,
ever open," a school that allowed jurors to become "practically ac-
quainted with the laws."'1 4 The "political good sense" of the Ameri-
cans, he felt, was due to the "long use that they have made of the jury
in civil cases."'15
The jury is also, it is said, one of the cornerstones of American lib-
erty. The civil jury does get a share of the glory, and the right is en-
shrined, as we all know, in the federal and state constitutions. 16 Yet
there is no question that the mystique of the jury mainly centers on
the criminal jury. The civil jury does not have the same sort of sacred
aura. One sign of this lesser status is the erosion of the rule that a jury
has to be unanimous. For the civil jury, the process began more than a
hundred years ago.17 The California Constitution of 1879 announced
that three-quarters of the jury members were enough to render a ver-
dict in civil cases.' 8 The same provision existed in Utah in 1892,19 in
Kentucky20 and Missouri2' around the turn of the century, and else-
where as well.
Moreover, the right to a civil jury was never so absolute as the right
to a jury in criminal law. Historically, the jury was not available in
equity or admiralty cases. It was missing in divorce cases, and in will
contests. Presumably, the legislatures of the states could have
changed these rules and declared them to be historical anomalies; the
legislatures could have given the right to all civil litigants. But legisla-
tures, on the whole, did not do this-at least not in a wholesale man-
ner. What cases did and what cases did not go to a jury was something
state legislatures and courts wrestled with over the years. Generally
speaking, the old law stayed pretty much as it was and it is still there
today. 22
13. Id. at 284.
14. Id. at 285.
15. Id.
16. In some states, the right to "trial by jury" is to remain "inviolate, and shall extend to all
cases in law, without regard to the amount in controversy." See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. II, § 7. In
the federal constitution and some state constitutions, there is a jurisdictional amount. See, e.g.,
MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XXIII. In Maryland, the current amount (after an
amendment in 1992) is $5,000. MD. CONST. art. XXIII.
17. With regard to the criminal jury, see HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 171-75.
18. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. I, § 7.
19. 1892 Utah Laws 44; see Hess v. White, 33 P. 243 (Utah 1893).
20. Ky. CONST. of 1891, § 248; Ky. REv. STAT. § 2268 (1903).
21. 1901 Mo. LAWS 190; Mo. REV. STAT. § 3782A (1906).
22. The colonists complained about the colonial courts of admiralty, which lacked a jury. See
Landsman, Unappreciated History, supra note 6, at 596. But when the United States gained
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The civil jury, then, had and still has a somewhat limited domain.
Of course, inside that domain, it has a great deal of power. In criminal
cases, there was at one time a doctrine or slogan to the effect that the
jury was the judge of law as well as fact. 23 It was never exactly clear
what this meant, or if it meant anything at all.24 In any event, judges
and statute books stopped repeating this mantra in almost all states
after the Revolution.25
The percentage of cases that go to the jury, in both civil and crimi-
nal cases, has probably been declining since 1800. Charles Clark and
Harry Shulman found the civil jury used in less than 4% of the civil
cases in New Haven and Waterbury, Connecticut in the decade of the
1920s. 26 Notoriously, most cases never reach the jury; they get settled
long in advance of trial. Nonetheless, the jury has a vast influence on
the law. The whole massive law of evidence is a tribute to the jury as
an institution. Without the jury, nobody would need most of these
rules-all that learning about relevance, the hearsay rule, and whatnot
might disappear, and the big fat volumes of Wigmore on Evidence and
others might be tossed into the garbage. Instead, the trained judge
would simply assess the evidence, and separate the wheat from the
chaff. This is of course what happens in most legal systems. The civil
jury is something of an endangered species. The English have just
about done away with it; and while the criminal jury has a certain
attractiveness overseas, nobody seems to want the civil equivalent.
What is the civil jury? The answer you would get from a lawyer
today, is that the civil jury is a body of (usually) twelve people, chosen
more or less at random from the general population. The panel of
jurors listens to the evidence, finds facts, and comes to a verdict. But
if we put it in such simple terms, we leave out a great deal of the story.
The jury sits and listens; but to what? The "evidence" it hears has
been sifted and winnowed in accordance with the arcane rules we
independence, the shoe was on the other foot, and the federal government did not modify admi-
ralty law to provide for a jury. Admiralty cases are jury-less to this day.
23. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY 1760-1830, at 257 n.37 (1975).
24. During the colonial period, however, some cases apparently went to the jury without in-
structions. An uninstructed jury almost necessarily has to draw its own conclusions about what
the law is or might be.
25. Two states, Indiana and Maryland, still have provisions in their constitutions to the effect
that the criminal jury "shall be Judges of Law, as well as of fact." IND. CONST. art. I, § 19; MD.
CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. xXIII. Apparently, these provisions have no real mean-
ing or effect in either state.
26. CHARLES E. CLARK & HARRY SHULMAN, A STUDY OF LAW ADMINISTRATION IN CON.
NECTICUT 28 (1937). In some categories, however, the civil jury was used more frequently. In
over 10% of the "auto negligence" cases, there was a jury trial. Id.
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have mentioned. All this learning, all this doctrine, rests on the theory
that juries cannot be trusted to hear certain kinds of information, no
matter how relevant these might be. Information has to be carefully
pre-digested and approved before it can get to the tender ears of the
panel. The jury is systematically "blindfolded" as to "whole catego-
ries of available information. '2 7 A jury, for example, cannot be told
that a defendant carries liability insurance.2 8
So, despite the theory that juries are mighty and sovereign, these
rules are a sure sign that jury power has to be taken with a grain of
salt. The law of evidence, as it developed in the nineteenth century,
tells a story about limitations on the power of the jury. And the limi-
tations are especially marked for civil juries. If a criminal jury utters
the magic words, "not guilty," the defendant gets up and walks out.
Nobody can set this verdict aside, or reverse it on appeal. A civil ver-
dict can be set aside. Many people would find rather startling a Con-
necticut statute, still in effect in 1918, which provided that the court, in
a civil case, "may, if it judges the jury have mistaken the evidence and
have brought in a verdict contrary to it, return them to a second con-
sideration. '2 9 If the jury was still stubborn, the judge could send them
back into their torture-chamber once more; only if they still stuck to
their guns at this point would the judge have to give up and accept
their decision.30 As William Schwarzer and Alan Hirsch neatly put it,
the jury is treated with a combination of "veneration and distrust."'31
And the distrust is "pervasive. ' 32 The practice of prohibiting jurors
from taking notes or asking questions, and "the tendency to keep
them in the dark about much of what goes on during the trial," are
signs of this distrust.33
On the other hand, it is certainly possible to tell a story that runs
somewhat to the contrary: decline in the power of the judge to control
the jury. The Connecticut statute reminds us that at one point the
judge could simply tell the jury to go back and try again if the verdict
was not to the judge's liking.34 In its most exaggerated form, this
power probably disappeared before the Revolution. Judges remained,
27. Shari S. Diamond et al., Blindfolding the Jury, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at
247, 248.
28. Id. at 247-49.
29. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 5788 (1918).
30. Id.
31. William W. Schwarzer & Alan Hirsch, The Modern American Jury: Reflections on Venera-
tion and Distrust, in VERDICr: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 399, 400.
32. Id. at 399.
33. Id.
34. CoN. GEN. STAT. § 5866.
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of course, awesome courtroom figures-and they had, potentially at
least, enormous power to influence the jury. The judge could, for ex-
ample, comment freely on the evidence, but legislatures ultimately
took away this power. There were traces of this development as early
as 1796; the Constitution of Tennessee provided that judges "shall not
charge juries with respect to matters of fact."'35 The movement to cut
down on the power of the judge "gathered impetus," as Robert W.
Millar rather irascibly put it, "under that wave of democratization
which reached its height about the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury."'36 State after state "succumbed" to what he called an "ill-
starred innovation. '37 By the early twentieth century, whether by
statute or high court decision, in most states the judges could no
longer comment on the evidence in charging the jury. Indeed, the Ar-
izona Constitution of 1912 ordered judges "not [to] charge juries with
respect to matters of fact nor comment thereon;" they were simply
supposed to "declare the law."'38
In the early nineteenth century, judges actually explained the law to
jurors. Charges to the jury were usually oral, not written. Judges
tended to use simple language, tailored to the case at hand. By the
turn of the century, however, the situation had changed in many
states: it was the lawyers who wrote the instructions, which they then
offered to the court, to be accepted or rejected.39 These instructions
were stereotypical and legalistic. They were instructions which did not
do much instructing.
Still later, there arose the practice of using canned instructions. In
New York, there was an active movement to "standardize" instruc-
tions to the jury in the 1920s. Judges of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County prepared a California Book of Approved Jury In-
structions ("BAJI") in 1938.40 "Approved" meant approved by the
courts; these were instructions that had passed muster in some re-
ported case or other. 41 BAJI inspired hosts of imitators, 42 and the
rush to codify instructions was on.43 In a few states, the pattern in-
35. TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. V, § 5.
36. ROBERT W. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPEC-
TIVE 310 (1952).
37. Id.
38. ARIZ. CONST. of 1912, art. VI, § 12.
39. On the history of civil instructions, see 2 ROBERT E. KEHOE, JR., JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR
CONTRACT CASES 1202 (1995).
40. Id. at 1221.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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structions are actually mandatory, and are officially approved by the
highest court of the state.44
Thus, in the twentieth century, the judge has lost what was once an
important source of power-the power to craft his or her own instruc-
tions. The judge can pick and choose among instructions that lawyers
dish up. This is no small matter. The instructions, however, are pretty
much confined to abstract black-letter rules. The judge cannot explain
them to the jury in commonsense terms and cannot comment on the
case or on the evidence. In this regard, the jury is pretty much on its
own and pretty much in command.
Many judges and jurists disliked what was happening to their role in
the civil trial. In 1915, when the process had gone very far, Lucilius
Emery deplored the decline of the "steadying influence of an able
judge" on the jury.45 The danger that a judge would overawe the jury,
if allowed to comment freely, Emery considered grossly exagger-
ated.46 He quoted from Justice Samuel Miller, who wrote in 1887,
rather cynically, that the party who demands a jury trial is likely to be
the "'party who fancies that, in appeals to the prejudices and feelings
of the tribunal which tries his case he may find something which will
induce them to depart from the strict law,"' while the party to a suit
who feels confidence that, on the law and the evidence he is in the
right, "'is always ready to submit his case to the court without a
jury.'"47
Justice Miller drew a sharp distinction between the civil and the
criminal jury.48 He was dubious about the value of the civil jury.49
Without strong guidance, and careful, clear instructions by a learned
judge, a (civil) jury trial was actually "a farce. °50 Nor did Miller think
much of the unanimity rule in civil cases (he wanted to keep it for
criminal cases). 51 He also liked the "authority" of the court to set
aside jury verdicts which were in "gross disregard of the weight of
evidence.15 2 Emery agreed: the jury needed "some check" on its "im-
pulse ... to disregard the law or to ignore the fair weight of the evi-
dence. '53 Edson Sunderland also weighed in on the side of the
44. Id. at 1222.
45. Lucilius A. Emery, Government by Jury, 24 YALE L.J. 265, 271 (1915).
46. Id. at 272.
47. Id. at 272-73 (quoting Justice Samuel Miller).
48. Samuel F. Miller, The System of Trial by Jury, 21 AM. L. REV. 859, 865-66 (1887).
49. Id. at 865.
50. Id. at 863.
51. Id. at 866.
52. Id. at 863.
53. Emery, supra note 45, at 272-73.
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judge. 54 The judge, he wrote, in 1915, should act as "a real adviser to
the jury."' 55 This would get rid of the tricks and the artifices and the
"appeals to passion, sympathy and prejudice. ' 56 Despite all this
learned and weighty opinion, nothing was done; and the system, in
effect, survives to this day.
It is a system in which, realistically, the judges retain a lot of quiet
authority to shape the trial and its proceedings. They also have the
power of the law behind them: judges can set aside bad verdicts and
they can choke cases off before they ever reach that point. There is
considerable evidence-for example, in Randolph Bergstrom's study
of tort litigation in New York City from 1870 to 1910-that judges
have used the power to dismiss cases with great facility and aban-
don.57 To be sure, tort cases that went to the jury at the turn of the
century mostly ended up with verdicts for the plaintiff. But a large
percentage of these claims, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, failed to get that far. They collided with the judge along the
way, and never survived the collision.
Can we draw any conclusions from these two developments-curb-
ing the judge; and curbing the jury? They seem, at first blush, to con-
tradict each other. They might reflect nothing more than the
widespread mistrust of power in the American legal system; and the
taste for constant checks and balances. The jury counterbalances the
judge; and the judge in turn counterbalances the jury. There may also
be some kind of fundamental ambivalence toward both the judge and
the jury. The jury is the people (in theory); but on the other hand, we
do not really trust the people. The judge is the law, the authority, and
the government. We vacillate in trusting these institutions too. Con-
sequently, the history of the civil jury and the history of judging are
both histories of increasing discipline and bondage.
From the late nineteenth century on, issues of judge and jury were
caught up in another real power struggle. I refer to the growing
number of tort cases-cases coming out of street railway accidents,
factories, and mines-and the beginning of products liability. There
was a kind of class war between plaintiffs and defendants in this
branch of the law. The plaintiffs, after all, were mostly ordinary peo-
ple; the defendants were businesses, and often big businesses at that.
Prevailing wisdom put the jury on the side of the plaintiffs; and the
54. Edson R. Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the Jury, 13 MICH. L. REV. 302 (1915).
55. Id. at 311.
56. Id.
57. RANDOLPH BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER: INJURY AND LAW IN NEW YORK CrTY,
1870-1910, at 119, 131 (1992).
[Vol. 48:201
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
judge on the other side. The civil jury was supposed to be made up of
deep pocket pickpockets, who loved to soak the rich. The idea that
juries use the "deep pocket" theory is firmly entrenched in the minds
of lawyers and judges. It goes back at least a century. It was com-
monplace in the late nineteenth century. Charles Francis Adams, Jr.,
in 1879, wrote that juries "'proverbially have little mercy for railroad
corporations' "; railroads, he thought, rather than face a jury, would be
well advised to settle out of court.58
Of course, all this is a vast oversimplification; but lots of people,
then and now, have believed it to be true. Hence, the politics of tort
law (and jury law) may have contributed to the moves and counter-
moves we have described. The struggle, in a way, is still with us today;
and the ups and downs of "tort reform" bear witness to it.
NULLIFICATION AND OTHER CRIMES
All lawyers know what juries are supposed to do. They are sup-
posed to take the law from the judge, who gives out the law in the
form of instructions. The jury then fits these nuggets of doctrine to
the actual facts of the case. Juries are not supposed to question the
law itself; that is out of bounds. If the jury deliberately ignores the
instructions, this is "nullification"; and nullification is considered very
bad-lawless in fact.59
But if nullification is so awful, why is it that the whole system is set
up in such a way that a jury that wanted to nullify can do so very
easily? In fact, what is impossible is detecting or controlling nullifica-
tion. This is a system where the jury leaves the courtroom and dis-
cusses the case in total isolation and secrecy. Verdicts are brief and
gnomic, and the jury is never asked to give reasons for what it does or
to explain itself in any way. In short, although juries are not supposed
to be "lawless," not supposed to toss a coin or decide cases on the
basis of prejudice or sympathy, there is absolutely nothing to prevent
the jury from doing any or all of these things.
Of course, this system is not irrational. It allows the law to bend, to
move a bit this way or that way, without tampering with the brittle
rule-structure. It allows for little tiny acts of nullification, which never
come to light (and which even the jury may not recognize as such).
58. PETER KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS HEAD: JUDGE-MADE LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 271 (1997) (quoting CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, NOTES ON RAILROAD ACCIDENTS
(1879)).
59. There is a large literature on nullification, and there are those who actually advocate it-
but, as far as I can tell, all of this concerns criminal trials only. See ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at
57-58.
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These acts may be ad hoc and temporary. The public, as Jerome
Frank put it, "turns to the jury for relief from ... dehumanized jus-
tice."'60 Frank himself was not enthusiastic about the system.61 It led,
he felt, to "a capriciousness that is unnecessary and socially harm-
ful."' 62 But there is a good case to be made for flexibility. And flexi-
bility, in turn, depends on secret deliberations and laconic verdicts.
This secrecy, however, is one reason why it is so easy for people to
believe in the "deep pocket" theory. In many tort cases, for example,
there is medical evidence on both sides of the case. Doctor A says the
plaintiff is suffering terribly, and the defendant's product caused this
suffering. Doctors B and C say this is medical nonsense. The jury is
supposed to weigh what Doctor A said against what Doctors B and C
said and decide who has the better case. But a jury certainly could
decide that Doctors B and C have the better argument; but what the
hell, the defendant is rich, and the plaintiff is poor, let us give the
plaintiff the money. The point is that nobody would ever know the
difference.
There is nothing to prevent this from happening. But does it hap-
pen, in fact? The evidence, in studies of tort cases (past and present)
suggests a much more balanced picture. Defendants win in a substan-
tial number of cases. Most cases in fact never go to trial. Many get
settled; the judge dismisses others out of hand. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, an armory of tough doctrines-contributory negligence was
one-gave the judge plenty of weapons he could use to get rid of
cases. 63 Those that went to the jury were, it is true, usually decided
for the plaintiff, but not by any means invariably. Defendants won
about one-third of the cases. In some cases, plaintiffs won, but got
rather skimpy damages. It is hard to translate awards from 1890 into
meaningful sums for the 1990s. But it does seem clear that the top
awards at least were far less than they are today. 64
Juries, in other words, were never the cardboard populists that my-
thology portrays them to be. But there is a lot unknown about histori-
cal patterns of jury decisions. Tort standards are notoriously vague.
Kalven and Zeisel, and others, have shown that criminal juries en-
forced unwritten laws.65 Did civil juries have the same habit? Were
there unwritten tort laws? Almost certainly the answer is yes. But it
60. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 175 (1930).
61. Id. at 178.
62. Id.
63. Landsman, Unappreciated History, supra note 6, at 606-09.
64. Lawrence M. Friedman, Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Law in the Late Nineteenth Century,
1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 351, 366-67.
65. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3.
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would take patient research, in long buried documents, to determine
the extent to which civil juries enforced unwritten laws.
As we have seen, the jury (especially the civil jury) is not the judge
of the law; it only decides the facts. But the line between the law and
the facts is obviously shaky and indistinct. As Dale Broeder put it,
"[w]hen the jury decides if the defendant acted reasonably, it is not
deciding a pure question of fact such as whether a dog drowned or the
defendant struck Brown. '66
Civil juries, then, make law, or a sort of law. But they do it quietly;
and their work does not leave many visible traces. How they make it,
and what sort of law, is rather obscure. And, of course, judges also
make law-and much more prominently. The transformation of tort
law over the last century or so owes much more to judges than to
juries, although juries played a part. This leads us to ask: How differ-
ent are the minds and hearts of judges compared to juries? Kalven
and Zeisel never finished, or published, their study of civil juries; but
Kalven, in one article, did leave us one tantalizing tidbit of informa-
tion.67 His evidence suggested, pretty strongly, that judges and juries
saw tort cases in almost exactly the same light.68 In civil cases, judge
and jury agreed 79% of the time.69 In the other 21% of the cases, one
would expect, from all the whooping and hollering, that judges would
tilt more toward defendants. But in fact, disagreements were distrib-
uted equally both ways.70 Judges, in short, were not one whit less or
more pro-plaintiff than juries.71 There is corroboration for this point
in a study of traffic negligence cases that went to trial in the late 1920s
in the Supreme Court of New York County.72 In this county, juries
gave the nod to plaintiff in just over 70% of the cases.73 But plaintiffs
also won 70% of the bench trials.74
66. Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386, 406
(1954).
67. Harry Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055 (1964).
68. Id. at 1065.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Silas A. Harris, Is the Jury Vanishing, 7 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 657 (1930).
73. Id. at 665.
74. Id. There is no way of knowing, of course, whether cases where the parties waived jury
trials really match jury cases. In New York County, the average judgment for plaintiff was sub-
stantially higher in jury cases ($4,566) than in bench trials ($3,332). Id. Figures for two Massa-
chusetts counties found the jury giving judgment for plaintiff just under 60% of the time; and
figures for three Connecticut counties found bench trials more favorable to defendants than jury
trials-defendants won just over half the bench trials, but only about 40% of the jury trials. Id.
But judges in Connecticut gave higher awards! Id. What one concludes from this-and other
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Nonetheless, the image of wild, runaway, populist juries shows no
signs of abating. It is backed up by anecdotes and scare stories.7 5 In
fact, research makes it clear that the fears are grossly exaggerated.76
Then why so persistent a mistake or misperception? Of course, big,
deviant cases, with huge recoveries, get the most publicity. Nobody is
interested in the boring and the normal. A recent study found that
national news magazines presented a distorted picture of the tort liti-
gation landscape. 77 The occasional big recovery probably skewed the
perception of many people in the nineteenth century too.
In the late nineteenth century, tort law was changing in a slow but
steady fashion; there was a retreat from the harsh rules that prevailed
in the earlier decades of the century.78 All aspects of the law, and all
institutions, including juries and judges, were becoming more sensitive
to the claims of plaintiffs in personal injury cases. Some business peo-
ple, who sensed this change, and disapproved of it, no doubt blamed it
on the jury. It was harder to blame it on the judges, or to attack the
judges, than to attack a bunch of ninnies drawn in from the street.
After all, it is the jury that actually decides; all the judge seems to do is
monitor the case, and wrap it in a package for the jury. The very
secrecy of the jury's work, perhaps, made it easier to suspect jurors of
blind prejudice. Judges at least had to defend what they did with rea-
sons and arguments.
Even today, huge awards are rare, but the media dishes up those
few with lip-smacking glee. This conveys the message of a system
gone amok. Yet insofar as there is a liability explosion, and there is, it
must be laid primarily at the door of the judges, not the jury. Who
developed the modern rules of strict liability for defective products?
Who dismantled the harsh doctrines of the nineteenth century and re-
placed them with newer ones that are more friendly to plaintiffs? It
was judges, not juries, who created the framework within which juries
did their dirty work. Of course, both judges and juries were respond-
ing to larger forces in society and in roughly similar ways. 79 In any
studies-is that the Oicture is a mixed one. It is abundantly clear that the knee-jerk jury is a
myth.
75. See generally Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil
Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1989, at 269 (discussing criticism of civil juries).
76. See, e.g., NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY (1995).
77. Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the Media as Your
Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort Litigation, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 419,
427 (1996); see Donald R. Songer, Tort Reform in South Carolina: The Effect of Empirical Re-
search on Elite Perceptions Concerning Jury Verdicts, 39 S.C. L. Rav. 585 (1988).
78. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 467-87 (2d ed. 1985).
79. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1985).
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event, the whole question of the rise of the liability explosion deserves
a lot more research.
WE, THE PEOPLE
A third point, which is most salient in criminal cases, but relevant in
civil cases too, is the question of the jury as a representative body. The
jury, as we know, has a long history, and has changed its function dra-
matically over the years. Originally, the jury was a body of neighbors,
chosen not because they were unbiased and knew nothing about the
case, but for almost the opposite reason. Because of their position in
the community, they were in a good position to know or divine the
truth. As time went by, the jury evolved and shifted from a panel of
knowing busybodies to twelve total virgins of fact.
We are now in the midst of what seems to be a further evolution.
The jury is supposed to be, not merely fair-minded and impartial, but
fully representative. It is supposed to be a cross-section of the commu-
nity; and this is now taken much more literally-at least as far as race,
gender, and the like are concerned.
The notion underlying this shift is what I have elsewhere called plu-
ral equality.80 The general idea is this: American society is segmented,
racially, ethnically, by gender, and by class-not to mention other di-
visions. Each segment has its own norms and viewpoints. No seg-
ment, and no set of norms, is superior to any other. Every segment
has an equal right to dignity, and to representation. The jury should
therefore reflect American diversity. Indeed, a litigant has a right to
this diversity. Anything else will result in imperfect justice.8'
Plural equality, as applied to the jury, represents a major break with
the past. Russell Duane, writing in 1906 about the abuse of personal
injury litigation, is a good example of what came before.8 2 Duane felt
we needed a "better class of jurors" in such cases.83 Justice, he
thought, "would be greatly forwarded if more jurors could be drawn
from the class of men who are in active business for themselves as
small traders or otherwise. ' 84 Obviously, as far as Duane was con-
80. I have explored this theme in LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW,
AUTHORITY, AND CULTURE 160 (1990).
81. See the discussion of criminal trials in ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 99-126. Abramson is
disturbed by the idea that there might be "not one justice for juries to represent but multiple
justices reducible to whom a juror happened to be by race, sex, national origin, religion, occupa-
tion, income, educational level, and on and on." Id. at 124.
82. Clarence A. Lightner et al., The Abuse of Personal Injury Litigation, 18 GREEN BAG 193,
215 (1906).
83. Id.
84. Id.
19981
214 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:201
cerned, many people, and probably most people, were simply not fit
to serve on a jury, and it would be best to keep them out. 85 Lots of
elites, legal and otherwise, no doubt agreed with him.86
In some states, the law was quite explicit: jury service was not for
everybody. Women of course were excluded. 87 But they were not the
only ones. At the turn of the century, the Kentucky statutes provided
that a juror, civil or criminal, had to be "a housekeeper, sober, tem-
perate, discreet and of good demeanor. '' 88 In Tennessee, a juror had
to be a "freeholder or householder. ' 89 In Maine, in 1903, municipal
officers were supposed to prepare the lists of jurors. 90 Jurors had to
be people of "good moral character, of approved integrity, of sound
judgment and well informed." 91 Presumably the town officers decided
who was sound and respectable. In Connecticut, too, jurors were sup-
posed to be men "esteemed in their community," people of "good
character, approved integrity, sound judgment and fair education. '92
In Pennsylvania, jury commissioners were to select "sober, intelligent,
and judicious persons. ' 93 The commissioners had the duty of elimi-
nating "decrepit, ignorant, intemperate" people.94 Clearly, in a state
like Pennsylvania, jurors were not to be randomly selected; they were
picked from a special, elite group.
85. Id.
86. An extreme form of this notion, strongly laced with racism, came to the surface when the
United States seized the Philippine Islands after the Spanish-American War. The United States
did not introduce either the civil or the criminal jury into the legal system of the islands. William
Howard Taft, the governor, explained it this way: "'Ninety percent of the people are so ignorant
that they could not sit on the jury to begin with and understand anything that would be ad-
duced."' WINFRED LEE THOMPSON, THE INTRODUCTION OF AMERICAN LAW IN THE PHILIP-
PINES AND PUERTO Rico, 1898-1905, at 95 (1989) (quoting William Howard Taft). An act of
January 12, 1901 established the right of trial by jury in criminal cases in Puerto Rico. 1902 P.R.
LAws 171.
87. Blacks as well-though not officially.
88. Ky. REV. STAT. § 2253 (1903).
89. TENN. CODE § 10006 (1932).
90. ME. REV. STAT. § 3 (1903).
91. Id.
92. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5681 (1918). Jurors had to be at least 25 years old as well. Id.
93. Klemmer v. Mt. Penn Gravity, 30 A. 274, 276 (Penn. 1894).
94. Klemmer, 30 A. at 276. Klemmer is an interesting case that sheds some light on how the
commissioners actually operated. This was a personal injury case in Berks County. Id. Defend-
ant railroad lost at the trial court and appealed on the basis of various procedural irregularities.
Id. One charge was that the commissioners did not select the jurors from the whole body of
qualified electors, but drew up their own lists, by inviting "persons of acknowledged promi-
nence" in the county "to hand in the names of a certain number of persons living in their districts
for the purpose of filling the jury wheel." Id. The appellate court allowed this practice, because
it would be impossible for anybody, in a county with about 30,000 qualified electors, to make
such a list without relying on "information derived" from other people. Id.
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Indeed, a New York law, in the same period (aimed at a single
county), explicitly required jurors to be "intelligent." 95 Not surpris-
ingly, the law did not define this term. In one interesting criminal
case, the defendant (convicted of extortion) appealed on the grounds
that the jury had been improperly selected.96 Among other things, he
complained about the exclusion of some prospective jurors on the
grounds that they were not "intelligent. ' 97 The appellate court
brushed this objection aside.98 It was, the Court thought, quite neces-
sary to have such a rule, to counterbalance the older rule "that no
person who had formed an opinion and expressed it was qualified to
act as a juror."99 Because of this principle, "the more intelligent men"
could be excluded from "serving as jurors in important criminal
cases"; and the only ones who would be allowed would be "the more
ignorant men." 100 The court continued:
daily newspapers, especially in the larger cities, are published in
great numbers. They place before their readers all the details of
[the crime] ... and report all judicial proceedings.... All intelligent
men are accustomed to read these newspapers, and may form more
or less definite opinions; they may even express such opinions ... to
others. Only the ignorant classes fail to read the newspapers from
day to day.10 1
To get an honest, intelligent jury, you have to have "men who have
heard and read of the case.' 0 2 Otherwise, you are doomed to settle
for the "ignorant classes.' 0 3 And the trial judge, using his "judgment
and sound discretion," was the proper one to decide who was, and
who was not, sufficiently "intelligent.' 0 4
This kind of thinking would, of course, be hissed off the stage today.
Plural equality has made these views unacceptable. The Supreme
Court upheld the New York "blue-ribbon" jury in 1947, but by a bare
95. 1905 N.Y. LAws 368. The law applied only to counties with populations of more than
200,000 but less than 300,000. Id. Jurors were to be "intelligent; of sound mind and judgment; of
good character; of approved integrity; and well informed." Id. A tall order.
96. People v. McLaughlin, 37 N.Y.S. 1005, 1008 (App. Div. 1896).
97. Id. at 1009.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1009-10.
102. McLaughlin, 37 N.Y.S. at 1009.
103. Id.
104. Id. Justice Miller had expressed just such a view in 1887. See Miller, supra note 48, at
867. Miller deplored the fact that the "man who takes an interest in what is going on in public
life, who reads the journals and gets the newspaper idea of occurrences in the community," is
excluded; while "the ignorant and stupid, those who take no interest in the world around them,"
get to serve. Id.
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majority (five to four).10 5 The whole concept of a "blue-ribbon" jury
is suspect today--and for good reason.
At the beginning of the century, as we said, the jury consisted en-
tirely of men. In the South, where most American blacks lived, the
juries were entirely white as well; the Southern states kept blacks off
the jury by hook or by crook. The Supreme Court held as early as
1879 that states could not legally exclude blacks from serving on
(criminal) juries.106 But in most of the South, this decision was a dead
letter, and stayed that way until the civil rights era. No statute for-
mally declared blacks ineligible; but juries were nonetheless entirely
white.
Quite a few states, incidentally, had provisions that put an age cap
on juries. In Maine, at the turn of the century, the jury lists were
confined to "persons under the age of seventy years."'01 7 Presumably
these old folks were nothing but doddering fools. In some states, in-
stead of an age cap, people of a certain age were allowed to choose:
they could serve or not, as they wished. In North Dakota, nobody
over sixty could be "compelled" to serve on a jury.'0 8 This is still the
case in some states-for example, in Indiana, where men and women
over sixty-five can be relieved of the burden of jury service if they are
"desirous" to be excused.10 9
The New York blue-ribbon law is much more about class than about
gender or race or age; but demographic and income factors are, of
course, hopelessly intertwined. In any event, jury selection has be-
come a more sensitive issue than it had been in the nineteenth cen-
tury. Plural equality subtly alters the theory of what a jury actually
does. A "blue-ribbon" jury was assumed to be a better jury than a
random jury: better able to find "facts," more impartial, more intelli-
gent than people scooped up off the streets. Today, a rather different,
implicit theory hangs in the air: the jury does not simply find "facts," it
invents facts. Facts do not exist as such. Facts are socially con-
structed. Facts are gendered and race-colored and class-colored.
They depend on the situation and the way you look at the situation. I
am not talking here about the more arcane, post-modern versions of
this theory. I am talking about this theory as a gut-level, unspoken
105. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 270 (1947). The New York special juries were packed
with businessmen and professionals. There were few, if any, women and absolutely no laborers.
106. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
107. ME. REV. STAT. § 2 (1903).
108. N.D. CODE § 814 (1913).
109. IND. ANN. CODE § 33-4-5-7(a) (West 1996).
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feeling that has affected the behavior and attitudes of all sorts of peo-
ple who (happily for them) have never heard of post-modern theory.
Curiously, this development may be, in a way, related to another
development in jury law which seems, superficially, to be marching in
the opposite direction altogether. Contemporary law has tended to
strip professionals and others of their right not to be on a jury. Illinois
law in 1921 exempted a whole list of occupations from jury duty-
public officials from the Governor on down, school teachers, lawyers,
ministers of the gospel, "constant ferrymen," police, pharmacists and
druggists, firemen, embalmers and undertakers, and editorial and
mechanical staffs of newspapers. 110 Other states had their own lists,
more or less similar-North Carolina added to the usual suspects
"millers of grist mills," brakemen and pilots, and members of the
state's National Guard."' Some of these exemptions were, of course,
based on the idea that society simply cannot spare certain people for
jury duty. If you were a "constant ferryman," for example, in Illinois,
you had to be excused from serving;1 2 otherwise, who would take
people across their rivers? Some notion of necessity was probably the
reason why Virginia exempted from service the six "lock keepers of
the Dismal Swamp Canal Co."113
In any event, the long list of exemptions meant that lots of profes-
sionals and public servants were not to be found on juries. Rich peo-
ple had their own ways of wriggling out of this public duty. Robert
Silverman found, in his study of Boston litigation, in the late nine-
teenth century, that "the best men rarely served on juries." 114
Neither, of course, did the worst. Jurors, in other words, tended to be
men of the middling sort: not day laborers or vagrants and not rich
businessmen or doctors and lawyers, but solid artisans and small
shopkeepers.
Today, the trend has been running strongly toward making every-
body eligible to serve. The list of exemptions in many states has
shrunk to almost nothing.115 On paper at least, there was and is an
enormous amount of begging and pleading and conniving to get off
juries, and it is by and large pretty successful. In all fairness, too,
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, § 4 (West 1921).
111. N.C. CODE § 2329 (1939).
112. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, § 4.
113. VA. STAT. § 5985 (1919). Cashiers and bank tellers, and "all persons while actually en-
gaged in harvesting or securing grain or hay or in cutting or securing tobacco" were exempt from
jury duty, as well. Id.
114. ROBERT A. SILVERMAN, LAW AND URBAN GROWTH: CIVIL LITIoATION IN THE BOSTON
TRIAL COURTS, 1880-1900, at 40 (1981).
115. Note, Developments in the Law: The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1455 (1997).
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many people have perfectly valid reasons to get themselves ex-
cused. 116 Trials have been getting longer, for one thing. A six-month
murder trial-or, worse perhaps, a six-month private anti-trust case-
is more than most people can handle in the light of their jobs and
family obligations.
Nonetheless, the jury is much more of a cross-section than at any
time in the past. It is certainly more diverse racially. Blacks freely
serve on juries, North and South. Women serve as often as men, if not
more so.117 It is hard to quarrel with these developments. Whether
women or minorities behave any differently than white men serving
on juries is still something of an open question. Trial lawyers are con-
vinced that certain classes of people are good or bad for accident cases
or criminal trials or whatever. They have their little rules of thumb,
their canned intuitions. In the nature of things, they have no hard
evidence to back up their guesses; and experiments with simulated ju-
ries suggest that these lawyers may be kidding themselves. The facts
of the case, the arguments, the actual evidence presented are all "con-
siderably more potent" than "individual differences among jurors."'118
On the other hand, long experience in picking juries might count for
something. And in huge cases, where money is no object, big law
firms use focus groups, mock juries, and the like, to try to figure out
what arguments to make and how to proceed, and to learn what works
and what does not.
The case for a "representative" jury, however, does not depend on
evidence that such a jury makes a difference to outcomes, although
such evidence would be useful. Justice not only has to be done, it has
to look like it is done. A woman suing in a tort case might find it
uncomfortable or unsettling if the whole jury were made up of men.
If juries are all lily-white, would you blame a black litigant for doubt-
ing her chances for justice? History, of course, would be on her side.
At any rate, race and sex discrimination are not supposed to enter into
jury selection.119 That much is clear. But how far should we go in
insisting that a jury has to be "representative?" Should it mean, not
116. Some of these are recognized in the statutes: in Iowa, for example, anyone "solely re-
sponsible for the daily care of a permanently disabled person" can be excused if jury service
would be a "risk" to the health of that person and the "mother of a breastfed child" can also opt
out. IOWA CODE ANN. § 607A5 (West 1996).
117. In criminal cases, the Supreme Court has forbidden the use of peremptory challenges to
gain, for example, all-white juries. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986); see Barbara A.
Babcock, Jury Service and Community Representation, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY
SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 460.
118. Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us about How Juries (Should) Make
Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 10 (1998).
119. Batson, 476.U.S. at 89.
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just race or gender or ethnic group, but social class and income group?
This question is still up for debate.
Nobody knows the future of the civil jury. The states are hacking
away at the rule that the jury has to be unanimous. Other aspects of
civil juries are also in flux, such as its size. As I said, the civil jury is
still controversial. People who complain about crazy decisions, insane
awards of damages, who find the hot coffee case at McDonald's 120
appalling, may think they are targeting greedy and unscrupulous law-
yers; but they are, in fact, calling into question the behavior of judges
and juries. Reforms-ceilings on tort recoveries, and the like-are
restraints on the power of juries, as well as restraints on the personal
injury bar.
The civil jury system unquestionably has its problems. It is an inter-
esting-and flawed-institution. The problems may be worst in com-
plex, technical cases-cases where the ideal decision-maker would be
somebody who understood brain chemistry, computers, monopoly
theory, or how to navigate through the ins and outs of some compli-
cated financial shenanigans. The civil jury has trouble with such cases.
It also has trouble grasping the legal complexities of cases. How could
it be otherwise, when typically all the the jury learns about the law
comes in the form of some densely packed, technical, high-falutin' "in-
structions.' 121 Presumably something could be done about this; the
law could be changed, allowing judges to instruct juries in everyday
language. There are movements in this direction-attempts to write
instructions that juries can actually understand. 22 This is all to the
good. Still, in really technical cases, how are twelve lay people sup-
posed to tell what is scientific trash, and what is not?123
Complaints about juries in complex cases are, in a way, similar to
the old complaints about letting ordinary boors and nobodies decide
cases. Of course, we can also ask how a poor judge is to tell the differ-
ence between junk science and real science. After all, what do judges
know about the physiology of the kidney, or the effect of stress on
120. Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV 93-02419, 1995 WL 360309, at
*1 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994); Big Jury Award for Coffee Burn, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1994, at D5.
121. I can cite my own experience of some years back. Together with a colleague, I inter-
viewed members of a hung jury (after the judge discharged them). It had been a long, drawn-out
private anti-trust case. The technical details concerned the computer business. This the jury
managed to understand (more or less). But the poor jury had absolutely no clue about the law,
which was dished up to them in the form of canned "instructions" that were completely opaque.
122. See Harvey S. Perlman, Pattern Jury Instructions: The Application of Social Science Re-
search, 65 NEB. L. REV. 520 (1986).
123. Occasionally, litigants have (unsuccessfully) raised the issue-claiming that some case
was just too much for ordinary jurors. See In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979).
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concrete abutments. Richard Lempert, who studied the issue of juries
in complex cases rather carefully, came to the conclusion that there is
no real cause for alarm.124 Juries sometimes do quite well in these
cases. Nor is there evidence that judges would do any better.125
This is not surprising. After all, judges are more or less amateurs
too. They are not specially trained for the job, the way European
judges are; they are ordinary lawyers-or worse, political lawyers.
This is not to deny that judges can gain experience, if they sit long
enough on the bench, in handling particular kinds of cases. But their
training, such as it is, does not and cannot include all the issues of
science and technology that might come before them in actual cases.
I doubt that many people today think of the jury as a kind of school
for democracy; or as necessary for a system of popular justice. Cer-
tainly, there is no such halo around the civil jury. But it is hard to
separate the civil jury from the rest of the texture of the American
justice system. Most cases never get to the jury; but they may be de-
cided in the shadow of what a jury is thought likely to do.
The civil jury may also play some part in legitimating the legal sys-
tem. And many of us have a certain affection for the civil jury, despite
its faults. It is something we are used to. It has the comfortable and
affectionate patina of history. Old cities that grow over the centuries,
all higgledy-piggledy, with crooked streets and ancient, tumble-down
houses, always seem more beautiful than new, planned, "rational" cit-
ies. Who knows? Some legal institutions may, in a way, be like that
too.
124. Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in
VERDICr: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 181, 214.
125. Id. at 182.
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